

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 102503 TOSEC 040006
ORIGIN AF-10

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 SS-15 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00
CCO-00 /041 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:JWHITING:PS
APPROVED BY AF:TWSEELYE
AF/E:RSPOST
S/S-MR. WISNER

-----051924Z 022284 /53

O R 051911Z MAY 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY SANA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 102503 TOSEC 040006

FOR SPIEGEL FROM WISNER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR,

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH
FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN: THE HORN OF AFRICA

BACKGROUND

1. THE ETHIOPIAN PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S (EPMG)
ORDERED OUSTER OF FIVE USG FACILITIES AND ASSOCIATED
PERSONNEL ON APRIL 23 AND THE MAY 3 DEPARTURE FOR MOSCOW
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OF EPMG HEAD LT. COL. MENGISTU DRAMATICALLY UNDERLINES THE
MILITARY REGIME'S CLEAR INTENT TO SUBSTITUTE THE USSR FOR
TRADITIONAL US-ETHIOPIAN TIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE ARMS
SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP.

2. WE HAVE SUSPENDED ALL MILITARY MATERIEL PPIPMENTS TO
ETHIOPIA AND ARE NOW CONSIDERING THE NEXT APPROPRIATE STEPS

TO TAKE WITH REGARD TO PIPELINE AND OTHER FUTURE SHIPMENTS OF MATERIEL, AS WELL AS THE FUTURE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF OUR MISSION IN ADDIS ABABA. SINCE THE APRIL 23 EXPULSION ORDER THE EPMG HAS TAKEN NO OTHER ADVERSE ACTIONS AND ETHIOPIA'S RECENTLY RETURNED CHARGE HAS URGED US TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE AND CONTINUE TO SUPPLY SOME MATERIEL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ANTI-US ACTION OF THE EPMG -- A REGIME WHICH MAY NOT SURVIVE -- SHOCKED AND DID NOT PLEASE MANY

ETHIOPIANS.

3. MEANWHILE, WITH REGARD TO SOMALIA, AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN WAS UNABLE TO SEE PRESIDENT SIAD PRIOR TO LEAVING MAY 5 FOR COM CONFERENCE BUT AMBASSADOR ADDOU INDICATED TO YOU ON MAY 3 THAT SIAD WAS SEEKING U.S. SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, TO PERMIT HIM TO REDUCE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR.

4. THE USSR IS MOVING RAPIDLY TO PROVIDE MILITARY HARDWARE TO ASSIST THE EPMG IN DEALING WITH THE ERITREAN AND OTHER DISSIDENTS FACING THE EPMG AND TO SHORE UP THE PERSONAL LEADERSHIP OF MENGISTU. A CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA AT THIS TIME -- OVER DJIBOUTI OR THE OGADEN -- IS NOT IN THE USSR'S INTEREST AND CONSEQUENTLY WE EXPECT THEM TO USE WHAT INFLUENCE THEY HAVE IN BOTH CAPITALS TO PREVENT CONFLICT.

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

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GENERAL

-- THE SITUATION IN THE HORN IS RECEIVING HIGH-LEVEL USG ATTENTION AS THE COMPLEX SITUATION UNFOLDS;

-- THE BASIC THRUST OF OUR POLICY IS TO RECOGNIZE THE DETERIORATION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EPMG AND TAILOR OUR PROGRAMS ACCORDINGLY; TO STRENGTHEN OUR TIES WITH KENYA AND SUDAN (E.G., THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL OF THE SALE OF SIX C-130'S); AND TO SEEK TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH SOMALIA, NOW THAT IT IS DISENCHANTED WITH THE USSR OVER ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ETHIOPIA.

ETHIOPIA

-- OUR RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA HAVE SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED AS A RESULT OF THE EPMG'S LEFTWARD DRIFT AND CLEAR INTENT TO SUBSTITUTE THE USSR

FOR THE US, REPLACING WHAT IT PERCEIVES TO BE
AN IDEOLOGICALLY INCOMPATIBLE ARMS SUPPLIER.

-- THE DECEMBER ARMS AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR AND THE
START OF DELIVERIES (CONVENTIONAL ARMS, APCS AND
T-34 TANKS) HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY EPMG ACTIONS MORE
BLATANTLY HOSTILE TO THE U.S. (E.G., THE APRIL 23
EXPULSIONS). MENGISTU'S MAY 3 TRIP TO MOSCOW IS
LIKELY TO CEMENT FURTHER HIS TIES WITH THE USSR.

-- WHILE WE RECEIVED NO FORMAL EPMG EXPLANATION--WHICH IS
IN KEEPING WITH OUR INABILITY TO GAIN ACCESS TO
MENGISTU TO DISCUSS OUR RELATIONSHIP--THE TIMING OF THE
EXPULSIONS MAY HAVE BEEN RELATED TO OUR APRIL 20 AND 21
DELIVERY OF NOTES NOTIFYING THEM OF THE HALVING OF THE
MAAG IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED WORLD-
WIDE REDUCTIONS AND, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVING
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OBVIATED THE NEED FOR THE KAGNEW STATION COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITY, OUR WISH TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER
OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO CLOSE KAGNEW BEFORE
SEPTEMBER. (HOWEVER, WE KNOW THAT EPMG HAD MADE
DECISION TO DO MOST OF THESE THINGS BEFORE DELIVERY OF
NOTES.) OUR FEBRUARY 24 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE HAD
DECIDED TO TERMINATE MAP GRANT MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR
ETHIOPIA IN FY78 BECAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS, ALSO WAS A FACTOR.

-- WE HAVE NOT PROVIDED ETHIOPIA WITH LETHAL MILITARY
MATERIEL FOR OVER TEN MONTHS AND DELIVERIES OF ALL NON-
LETHAL MATERIEL HAS ALSO BEEN SUSPENDED, WITHOUT
PUBLICITY, PENDING A CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.
THE ETHIOPIAN CLOSURE OF THE MAAG AND REPUDIATION OF
OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT SUGGEST THAT
THEY NO LONGER WISH TO CONTINUE A MILITARY RELATION-
SHIP WITH US.

-- MENGISTU WILL UNDOUBTEDLY USE HIS ACTIONS TO END
MILITARY TIES WITH THE U.S. TO PRESSURE THE SOVIETS TO
ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF MILITARY MATERIEL NEEDED BY
MENGISTU TO STAY IN POWER AND TO DEAL WITH ERITREA
AND OTHER DISSIDENTS.

SOMALIA

-- SOMALIA'S DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE SOVIETS PRODUCED BY
USSR ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ETHIOPIA OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY
TO FACILITATE A SOVIET DISENGAGEMENT THERE;

-- WE WILL HAVE TO MOVE CAREFULLY BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF SOVIET ADVISERS THROUGHOUT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT AND ITS CONTINUING RELIANCE ON SOVIET ARMS. SIAD CONSEQUENTLY CANNOT MOVE QUICKLY IN OUR DIRECTION;

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-- THE SOMALIS HAVE APPROACHED US TO SEEK ASSURANCES THAT THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE MET IF THEY ALTERED THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. WE ARE WILLING TO RESUME AN ACTIVE AID PROGRAM THERE AND TO DISCUSS AREAS OF FUTURE

COOPERATION, BUT WE FEEL OUR EFFORTS ARE IN NEED OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER WESTERN NATIONS AS WELL AS MODERATE ARAB STATES.

-- IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WE RECOGNIZE SOMALIA'S NEED TO PROVIDE FOR ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS (AS OPPOSED TO ARMS FOR THE REALIZATION OF ITS IRREDENTIST GOALS), BUT UNTIL WE COMPLETE THE REVIEW OF OUR WORLDWIDE ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, WE CANNOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS. WE ARE LOOKING TO WHAT NON-USG SOURCES OF ARMS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE, AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN WHAT THE UNITED KINGDOM BELIEVES IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE.

-- BECAUSE OF ITS INFLUENCE AND AVAILABLE FINANCIAL RESOURCES, WE ARE CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH SAUDI ARABIA ABOUT THE COORDINATION OF OUR POLICIES IN SOMALIA. WE ARE ALSO CONSULTING WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND OTHER EUROPEANS.

DJIBOUTI

-- AS AN EXPRESSION OF OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN AN INDEPENDENT AND VIABLE DJIBOUTI, WE OPENED A CONSULATE GENERAL THERE ON APRIL 25 (TO BE RAISED TO AN EMBASSY AFTER INDEPENDENCE).

-- DJIBOUTI'S INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE ENHANCED BY A CONTINUING FRENCH MILITARY PRESENCE.

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-- WE ARE ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THE

USSR'S INTEREST TO AVOID AN ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI
CONFLICT OVER DJIBOUTI OR OTHER AREAS OF CONTENTION.

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PAGE 01 STATE 102503
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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 /023 R

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DRAFTED BY:AF/E:JWHITING

APPROVED BY:AF/E:JWHITING

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P 110446Z MAY 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 102503

FOLLOWING SECSTATE 102503 SENT ACTION SECRETARY INFO ADDIS
ABABA CAIRO JIDDA KHARTOUM MOGADISCIO NAIROBI SANA MAY 5;
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

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Message Attributes

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Sent Date: 05-May-1977 12:00:00 am
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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
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Review Release Event: n/a
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
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Subject: BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN: THE HORN OF AFRICA BACKGROUND
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, US, UK, ET, SO, SU, KE, SA, YE, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (OWEN, DAVID)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
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